With regard to this last point [breaking the impersonality of man when it tends to disrupt the order of human existence in society], however, some caution is suggested.
The order of human existence in society, as well as the use of force, must be understood in the fullness of its ontological meaning. Perhaps the use of force is not primarily a means "to protect society" against the lawbreaker. While punishment, for example, certainly has the function of protecting the members of a society against the disorganization of their lives by the disturbing actions of their fellow members, it also has the purpose of restoring the personal order in the soul of the delinquent and, as far as that is possible, of reconstructing him as a person.
A utilitarian "philosophy" of criminal law would obscure the problem that, in the order and disorder of society, the Ought in the ontological sense is at stake and that this Ought has its seat in the person of every single man. . . .